Several commentaries on the Data Act have now been published. I myself have contributed to the upcoming Bomhard/Schmidt-Kessel commentary, where I analyse Articles 8, 9 and 12 of the Data Act. Among other points, I argue that data holders are generally under an obligation to perform first. This is a key point: if performance were conditional upon the prior conclusion of a FRAND-compliant agreement, data recipients could be forced to enforce a contractual right to data access rather than rely on a direct statutory claim.
In other words: may a data holder demand upfront compensation before making data available — or must the data be provided first?
I take the view that the data access obligations established under the Data Act constitute direct statutory claims. This position is already contested in some early commentaries. I will return to this in the next edition of the commentary and, in the meantime, explore key arguments here.
Background
The purpose of the Data Act is to promote the establishment of functional data markets. To this end, Chapter III sets out rules for access and use, including obligations of data holders under Article 5. These rules also apply to other legal obligations of data provision. (Article 12 explicitly excludes the application of this chapter to obligations under competition law.)
Article 8 introduces the principle of FRAND terms in the context of data access obligations. Article 9 regulates the compensation mechanisms available to data holders. However, the Data Act does not establish a standalone right for the data holder to claim compensation. Rather, Article 9 sets the framework for agreements on compensation.
Arguments against an upfront obligation for data holders
It might be argued that:
- No express obligation to perform first is found in the text of the Data Act.
- Freedom of contract allows parties to agree to advance payment, as long as the terms remain FRAND-compliant.
- The concept of “reasonable compensation” could be interpreted as implying a protective mechanism for data holders, allowing for upfront payment to mitigate default risk.
- The data holder may otherwise bear the entire insolvency risk — a risk which some believe should be passed on to the recipient at least in part.
From this view, an upfront obligation might only apply in narrow cases, and advance payments could be justified under FRAND principles — unless such a request is found to be unfair.
Article 9(4) supports this limitation: for some categories of data recipients, even a proportionate advance payment may be deemed unfair. Similarly, creditworthiness checks on such recipients may violate FRAND.
Arguments in favour of a primary obligation for data holders
The text itself already presupposes the existence of a data access obligation. Article 8(1) states:
“Where a data holder is required to make data available to a data recipient, the data holder shall agree with the data recipient the arrangements for making the data available and…”
This implies that the obligation to provide data already exists — the agreement governs the modalities, not the existence of the obligation. Notably, only the data holder is subject to an obligation; the recipient is not.
Article 9(1) reinforces this:
“Any compensation agreed between a data holder and a data recipient for making data available […] shall…”
This phrasing implies that compensation is not a precondition, but rather an element to be addressed if an agreement is concluded.
From a structural perspective, this means that the existence of the obligation (“whether”) is settled by law, while the modality (“how”) is open to contractual arrangements. A model that makes access conditional upon prior payment could itself be deemed unfair — particularly for recipients listed in Article 9(4).
The purpose of the Data Act is not to guarantee compensation to data holders but to ensure functioning data markets. While full uncompensated access is not expected, even a system with primary data holder obligation does not preclude compensation — it only shifts the risk allocation.
This risk is further mitigated by Article 11, which allows data holders to invoke remedial mechanisms in cases of abuse or deception — for example, if the data recipient misrepresented their willingness or ability to pay. Hence, the legitimate interest in demanding advance payment is substantially weakened.
Practical Implications
These considerations do not exclude compensation — they merely concern the timing of performance. That is why Article 9 alone cannot resolve the issue; Article 8 and the fairness test for contract terms play a crucial role.
Data holders may still justify advance payment in specific circumstances or protect themselves using technical safeguards. However, the default position appears to require performance prior to or independently of payment.
Upfront Obligations under the Data Act – Who Must Act First?
Several commentaries on the Data Act have now been published. I myself have contributed to the upcoming Bomhard/Schmidt-Kessel commentary, where I analyse Articles 8, 9 and 12 of the Data Act. Among other points, I argue that data holders are generally under an obligation to perform first. This is a key point: if performance were conditional upon the prior conclusion of a FRAND-compliant agreement, data recipients could be forced to enforce a contractual right to data access rather than rely on a direct statutory claim.
In other words: may a data holder demand upfront compensation before making data available — or must the data be provided first?
I take the view that the data access obligations established under the Data Act constitute direct statutory claims. This position is already contested in some early commentaries. I will return to this in the next edition of the commentary and, in the meantime, explore key arguments here.
Background
The purpose of the Data Act is to promote the establishment of functional data markets. To this end, Chapter III sets out rules for access and use, including obligations of data holders under Article 5. These rules also apply to other legal obligations of data provision. (Article 12 explicitly excludes the application of this chapter to obligations under competition law.)
Article 8 introduces the principle of FRAND terms in the context of data access obligations. Article 9 regulates the compensation mechanisms available to data holders. However, the Data Act does not establish a standalone right for the data holder to claim compensation. Rather, Article 9 sets the framework for agreements on compensation.
Arguments against an upfront obligation for data holders
It might be argued that:
From this view, an upfront obligation might only apply in narrow cases, and advance payments could be justified under FRAND principles — unless such a request is found to be unfair.
Article 9(4) supports this limitation: for some categories of data recipients, even a proportionate advance payment may be deemed unfair. Similarly, creditworthiness checks on such recipients may violate FRAND.
Arguments in favour of a primary obligation for data holders
The text itself already presupposes the existence of a data access obligation. Article 8(1) states:
This implies that the obligation to provide data already exists — the agreement governs the modalities, not the existence of the obligation. Notably, only the data holder is subject to an obligation; the recipient is not.
Article 9(1) reinforces this:
This phrasing implies that compensation is not a precondition, but rather an element to be addressed if an agreement is concluded.
From a structural perspective, this means that the existence of the obligation (“whether”) is settled by law, while the modality (“how”) is open to contractual arrangements. A model that makes access conditional upon prior payment could itself be deemed unfair — particularly for recipients listed in Article 9(4).
The purpose of the Data Act is not to guarantee compensation to data holders but to ensure functioning data markets. While full uncompensated access is not expected, even a system with primary data holder obligation does not preclude compensation — it only shifts the risk allocation.
This risk is further mitigated by Article 11, which allows data holders to invoke remedial mechanisms in cases of abuse or deception — for example, if the data recipient misrepresented their willingness or ability to pay. Hence, the legitimate interest in demanding advance payment is substantially weakened.
Practical Implications
These considerations do not exclude compensation — they merely concern the timing of performance. That is why Article 9 alone cannot resolve the issue; Article 8 and the fairness test for contract terms play a crucial role.
Data holders may still justify advance payment in specific circumstances or protect themselves using technical safeguards. However, the default position appears to require performance prior to or independently of payment.
About the author
Dr. Sebastian Louven
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