Last week, the Ger­man Fede­ral Car­tel Office (Bun­des­kar­tell­amt, BKar­tA) published a press release out­lining its preli­mi­na­ry legal assess­ment of Amazon’s cur­rent pri­ce con­trol prac­ti­ces. Accor­ding to the aut­ho­ri­ty, the con­duct could amount to an abu­se both under the spe­cial rules for lar­ge digi­tal plat­forms pur­su­ant to Sec­tion 19a(2) of the Ger­man Com­pe­ti­ti­on Act (GWB) and under the gene­ral pro­hi­bi­ti­on of abu­se of mar­ket dominance.

This is not a final decis­i­on. Ama­zon now has the oppor­tu­ni­ty to respond to the preli­mi­na­ry fin­dings. An ami­ca­ble reso­lu­ti­on of the case — e.g. through com­mit­ments — remains pos­si­ble. Howe­ver, the aut­ho­ri­ty has alre­a­dy made its direc­tion of tra­vel quite clear. Here is a brief overview:


What is the case about?

The sub­ject of the pro­cee­ding is Amazon’s use of pri­ce con­trol mecha­nisms on its mar­ket­place. The­se mecha­nisms set pri­ce thres­holds that sel­lers on the plat­form are not sup­po­sed to exceed. From Amazon’s per­spec­ti­ve, offers that are pri­ced too high or are other­wi­se non-com­pli­ant are remo­ved or excluded from the so-cal­led “Buy Box.” This fea­ture deter­mi­nes the visi­bi­li­ty of sel­lers to end cus­to­mers on Ama­zon. Exclu­si­on from the Buy Box signi­fi­cant­ly redu­ces the visi­bi­li­ty of a seller’s offer.

The com­pe­ti­ti­on con­cerns ari­se from two addi­tio­nal fac­tors. First, Ama­zon accounts for around 60% of reve­nue gene­ra­ted in online goods retail in Ger­ma­ny, accor­ding to the BKar­tA. This figu­re is not sur­pri­sing: the aut­ho­ri­ty had alre­a­dy desi­gna­ted Ama­zon as an under­ta­king of para­mount cross-mar­ket signi­fi­can­ce under Sec­tion 19a(1) GWB, which trig­gers spe­cial inter­ven­ti­on powers under Sec­tion 19a(2). Second, Ama­zon acts not only as a plat­form ope­ra­tor but also as a com­pe­ti­tor through its own retail ope­ra­ti­ons. This dual role gives the alre­a­dy domi­nant plat­form con­sidera­ble levera­ge over depen­dent sellers.

Key concerns: Visibility, concentration, and coordination

The BKar­tA sum­ma­ri­ses its anti­trust con­cerns under three main headings:

  1. Visi­bi­li­ty rest­ric­tions: Accor­ding to the aut­ho­ri­ty, the cri­te­ria used to trig­ger pri­ce con­trol are not based on objec­ti­ve bench­marks and can be arbi­tra­ri­ly deter­mi­ned by Ama­zon. Sel­lers lack trans­pa­ren­cy, and the pri­ce thres­holds chan­ge fre­quent­ly, making them unpre­dic­ta­ble. This can amount to arbi­tra­ry con­duct, akin to abu­si­ve account sus­pen­si­ons. In prin­ci­ple, sel­lers must retain upward pri­cing free­dom. A pri­ce dee­med “too high” by Ama­zon alo­ne is not a legi­ti­ma­te reason to rest­rict visibility.
  2. Con­cen­tra­ti­on effects: Pri­ce con­trols may pre­vent sel­lers from cove­ring their cos­ts. This crea­tes a risk of dis­pla­ce­ment from the plat­form. Given Amazon’s signi­fi­can­ce in the online retail mar­ket, such dis­pla­ce­ment may lead to exclu­si­on from the mar­ket altog­e­ther. In com­bi­na­ti­on with Amazon’s own retail busi­ness, this gives the com­pa­ny signi­fi­cant levera­ge over its com­pe­ti­tors on the marketplace.
  3. Coor­di­na­ti­on effects: The BKar­tA also suspects that Ama­zon may be enfor­cing a uni­form pri­cing stra­tegy across the wider e‑commerce sec­tor. This could result in de fac­to pri­ce coor­di­na­ti­on among inde­pen­dent sel­lers, ther­eby sup­pres­sing pri­cing initia­ti­ves else­whe­re in the online retail market.

Noteworthy legal and economic implications

What is par­ti­cu­lar­ly remar­kab­le is that the suspec­ted abu­si­ve con­duct con­cerns maxi­mum pri­ces, not mini­mum pri­ces. This is note­wor­t­hy, as the pre­vai­ling assump­ti­on is that low pri­ces bene­fit con­su­mers and are con­sis­tent with com­pe­ti­ti­on. Howe­ver, the BKar­tA appears to reco­g­ni­se that down­ward pri­ce pres­su­re can also be a tool for plat­forms to distort com­pe­ti­ti­on in their favour. Should this legal view gain trac­tion, it could have a mate­ri­al posi­ti­ve impact for inde­pen­dent sellers.

Ano­ther important aspect rela­tes to the data basis used to deter­mi­ne the pri­ce con­trols. Accor­ding to the press release, Ama­zon does not rely sole­ly on mar­ket­place pri­ces. Ins­tead, it uses algo­rith­ms and sta­tis­ti­cal models that “draw on various pri­ce com­pon­ents from cur­rent and past offers on Ama­zon and exter­nal com­pe­ti­tors to dyna­mi­cal­ly cal­cu­la­te varia­ble maxi­mum pri­ces for sel­ler offers.” This is a par­ti­cu­lar­ly important detail. It indi­ca­tes that Ama­zon is not just enga­ging in pri­ce con­trol within its own eco­sys­tem, but poten­ti­al­ly across the broa­der com­pe­ti­ti­ve land­scape. The prac­ti­cal effect is simi­lar to that of most-favou­red-nati­on clau­ses, even if the legal form differs.

What happens next?

The pro­cee­ding is based on Sec­tion 19a(2) GWB, which gives the BKar­tA exten­ded powers over cer­tain desi­gna­ted com­pa­nies, inclu­ding Ama­zon. The aut­ho­ri­ty may take robust action under this frame­work. Alter­na­tively, it may issue a stan­dard admi­nis­tra­ti­ve order under the gene­ral rules on abu­se of dominance.

Ama­zon may still rai­se objec­tions and pro­vi­de jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on for its prac­ti­ces. If suc­cessful, this could avo­id the issu­an­ce of a for­mal decis­i­on. Alter­na­tively, Ama­zon could proac­tively offer reme­dies to address the con­cerns and bring the mat­ter to an ami­ca­ble close.

About the author

Porträtbild von Dr. Sebastian Louven

Dr. Sebastian Louven

I have been an independent lawyer since 2016 and advise mainly on antitrust law and telecommunications law. Since 2022 I am a specialist lawyer for international business law.

Other articles

Digital Markets Act – Private Enforcement

The Digi­tal Mar­kets Act con­ta­ins regu­la­ti­ons for a Euro­pean approach to mar­ket regu­la­ti­on of digi­tal plat­forms. First of all, this includes the iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on as a rele­vant gatekeeper.…

Read more

Brogsitter Defence Returns

Brog­sit­ter Defence Returns­So­me time ago, the ECJ ruled in its Wikin­ger­hof decis­i­on on inter­na­tio­nal juris­dic­tion in anti­trust actions if the­re is also a con­trac­tu­al rela­ti­onship between…

Read more
Louven Rechtsanwälte PartGmbB

New partner: Dr Verena Louven

lou​ven​.legal has recent­ly beco­me a PartGmbB. Dr Vere­na Lou­ven joi­n­ed as a part­ner. She brings seve­ral years of legal expe­ri­ence in busi­ness and in par­ti­cu­lar com­ple­ments the…

Read more

Newsletter

Updates on antitrust and telecommunications law