In its some months ago judgment in Enel v. Goog­le, the Court of Jus­ti­ce of the Euro­pean Uni­on (CJEU) held that Goog­le is, in prin­ci­ple, obli­ged to pro­vi­de inter­ope­ra­bi­li­ty tem­pla­tes for third-par­ty apps within a reasonable time­frame. Exemp­ti­ons app­ly only whe­re the plat­form ope­ra­tor can demons­tra­te a thre­at to the secu­ri­ty or inte­gri­ty of the platform.

In other words, the plat­form must actively enable inter­ope­ra­bi­li­ty. It can no lon­ger rely on the argu­ment that no access has been gran­ted; it must tech­ni­cal­ly faci­li­ta­te access whe­re appli­ca­ble. Fail­ure to com­ply may con­sti­tu­te abu­se of dominance.

In prac­ti­ce, this makes inter­ope­ra­bi­li­ty via tem­pla­tes a key com­pli­ance issue. Com­pe­ti­ti­on must be enab­led on the plat­form — and tem­pla­tes func­tion as the tech­ni­cal enabler for third-par­ty integration.

This artic­le ana­ly­ses the com­pe­ti­ti­on law impli­ca­ti­ons of man­da­to­ry inter­ope­ra­bi­li­ty and the legal risks of exclu­sio­na­ry tem­p­la­te stra­te­gies.

Challenges of Mandatory Templates

The CJEU does not defi­ne the tech­ni­cal spe­ci­fics of such tem­pla­tes. It lea­ves open whe­ther pro­prie­ta­ry tem­pla­tes are suf­fi­ci­ent or whe­ther uni­form stan­dards must be deve­lo­ped. This will depend on the indi­vi­du­al case and the poten­ti­al for abu­si­ve con­duct under Artic­le 102 TFEU.

The judgment impli­es that tem­pla­tes must not com­pro­mi­se the secu­ri­ty or func­tion­a­li­ty of the third-par­ty app its­elf. Sin­ce app pro­vi­ders ope­ra­te in diver­se tech­ni­cal envi­ron­ments, the plat­form ope­ra­tor must ali­gn its tem­pla­tes accor­din­gly — poten­ti­al­ly inclu­ding back­ward com­pa­ti­bi­li­ty, ongo­ing main­ten­an­ce, and updates.

Legal­ly, the obli­ga­ti­on ari­ses from the gene­ral abu­se of domi­nan­ce pro­hi­bi­ti­on, sup­ple­men­ted by equal tre­at­ment prin­ci­ples. The domi­nant plat­form must not tre­at third-par­ty apps less favour­a­b­ly than its own. Once a plat­form is ope­ned to third-par­ty access, regu­la­to­ry obli­ga­ti­ons attach, even if the plat­form was initi­al­ly built for inter­nal use.

Excep­ti­ons to this obli­ga­ti­on are nar­row. Neither capa­ci­ty cons­traints nor cost con­cerns suf­fice. Only pro­ven risks to secu­ri­ty or inte­gri­ty may jus­ti­fy refu­sal.

“Too Expensive” Is Not a Valid Defence

Domi­nant plat­forms must deve­lop tem­pla­tes within a reasonable time­frame. They can­not reject access requests based on cost con­cerns alo­ne. The­se obli­ga­ti­ons reflect the enhan­ced respon­si­bi­li­ty domi­nant firms owe to the com­pe­ti­ti­ve process.

The CJEU lea­ves open whe­ther the cos­ts of tem­p­la­te deve­lo­p­ment may be pas­sed on to the deman­ding unter­ta­king. Howe­ver, it pro­vi­des clear gui­dance on the rele­vant pri­cing frame­work. See in par­ti­cu­lar head­no­te 3 of the Enel/​Google decision:

Artic­le 102 TFEU must be inter­pre­ted as mea­ning that whe­re the con­duct of a domi­nant under­ta­king con­sists in refu­sing to ensu­re the inter­ope­ra­bi­li­ty of a third-par­ty appli­ca­ti­on with a digi­tal plat­form it con­trols, that refu­sal may amount to an abu­se unless the domi­nant under­ta­king can show that, at the time of the request, the­re was no exis­ting tem­p­la­te and that the deve­lo­p­ment of such a tem­p­la­te would jeo­par­di­se the platform’s inte­gri­ty or secu­ri­ty, or would be tech­ni­cal­ly impos­si­ble. Fai­ling such jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on, the domi­nant firm must deve­lop such a tem­p­la­te within a reasonable time and, whe­re appro­pria­te, for appro­pria­te remu­ne­ra­ti­on, taking into account the reques­t­ing undertaking’s needs, the actu­al deve­lo­p­ment cos­ts, and the domi­nant undertaking’s right to a reasonable return.

- CJEU, Judgment of 25 Febru­ary 2025 – C‑233/23

From this, we deri­ve four pri­cing principles:

  1. Appro­pria­ten­ess: Any remu­ne­ra­ti­on must be reasonable and is sub­ject to abu­se-of-domi­nan­ce scrutiny.
  2. Demand ori­en­ta­ti­on: The tem­p­la­te must meet the tech­ni­cal needs of the third-par­ty pro­vi­der, and can­not be dis­missed arbitrarily.
  3. Cost-based jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on: Actu­al deve­lo­p­ment cos­ts may be con­side­red, but must be documented.
  4. Value-sha­ring: The domi­nant plat­form may retain a reasonable bene­fit from the tem­p­la­te, but must off­set the­se advan­ta­ges against the char­ges imposed.

If the access deman­ding unter­ta­king is wil­ling to bear cos­ts, the cost argu­ment beco­mes even less tenable. Such an offer may be used as a stra­te­gic lever to com­pel time­ly access.

Must the Platform Offer Just Access – or Viable Access?

This leads to a key qua­li­ta­ti­ve ques­ti­on: Is the plat­form only requi­red to grant tech­ni­cal access, or must it ensu­re com­mer­ci­al­ly via­ble access?

The ans­wer depends on com­pa­ra­ti­ve tre­at­ment: if the platform’s own ser­vices or pre­fer­red part­ners recei­ve high-per­for­mance access, third-par­ty access must not be undu­ly degra­ded. Any­thing less would likely vio­la­te the equal tre­at­ment prin­ci­ple and may qua­li­fy as exclu­sio­na­ry conduct.

How Can Companies Mitigate the Risk of Unlawful Access Denial?

For plat­form ope­ra­tors:

  • Proac­tively defi­ne access poli­ci­es and tech­ni­cal specifications.
  • Publish API docu­men­ta­ti­on and tem­p­la­te inte­gra­ti­on guidance.
  • Cle­ar­ly spe­ci­fy jus­ti­fia­ble excep­ti­ons (e.g. docu­men­ted secu­ri­ty concerns).
  • Track and docu­ment deve­lo­p­ment cos­ts ear­ly, to jus­ti­fy any future pricing.
  • Prepa­re for future liti­ga­ti­on by estab­li­shing trans­pa­rent, non-dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry access procedures.

For third-par­ty pro­vi­ders:

  • Ensu­re tech­ni­cal com­pli­ance with secu­ri­ty and inte­gra­ti­on standards.
  • Proac­tively address and rebut poten­ti­al secu­ri­ty concerns.
  • Whe­re no secu­ri­ty risks exist, demand tem­p­la­te access and assert the right under Enel/​Google.
  • Con­sider co-finan­cing the deve­lo­p­ment, if neces­sa­ry, to expe­di­te access.

The CJEU’s decis­i­on gives third-par­ty pro­vi­ders a powerful legal tool. Plat­form ope­ra­tors must no lon­ger deci­de uni­la­te­ral­ly who may or may not access the ecosystem.


We are a law firm spe­cia­li­sed at the inter­sec­tion of law, tech­no­lo­gy, and com­pe­ti­ti­on. We con­tri­bu­te to aca­de­mic and regu­la­to­ry deba­tes and draw from first-hand entre­pre­neu­ri­al experience.

If your busi­ness is affec­ted by com­plex plat­form access issues, get in touch for prag­ma­tic, for­ward-thin­king solutions.

About the author

Porträtbild von Dr. Sebastian Louven

Dr. Sebastian Louven

I have been an independent lawyer since 2016 and advise mainly on antitrust law and telecommunications law. Since 2022 I am a specialist lawyer for international business law.

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