In ear­ly March, I repor­ted on the ongo­ing anti­trust inves­ti­ga­ti­on by the French Com­pe­ti­ti­on Aut­ho­ri­ty (Auto­ri­té de la Con­cur­rence) into Apple’s App Track­ing Trans­pa­ren­cy Frame­work (ATTF). At the time, reports indi­ca­ted that the impo­si­ti­on of a fine was being con­side­red. Germany’s Bun­des­kar­tell­amt (BKar­tA) has also rai­sed com­pe­ti­ti­on con­cerns in a sepa­ra­te proceeding.

A few days ago, the French aut­ho­ri­ty announ­ced that it has impo­sed a fine of €150 mil­li­on on Apple in con­nec­tion with its prac­ti­ces sur­roun­ding the ATTF. The full decis­i­on is available in French, along with a pre­sen­ta­ti­on sum­ma­ri­sing the key points.


Background of the French proceedings

Apple intro­du­ced the App Track­ing Trans­pa­ren­cy Frame­work in April 2021 via an update to its ope­ra­ting sys­tems. It requi­res third-par­ty app deve­lo­pers in the iOS App Store to obtain addi­tio­nal user con­sent befo­re acces­sing cer­tain types of data for adver­ti­sing pur­po­ses. Apple posi­tio­ned this step as a pri­va­cy mea­su­re aimed at pro­tec­ting end-users of iOS and iPadOS.

In respon­se to com­plaints from indus­try asso­cia­ti­ons, the French Com­pe­ti­ti­on Aut­ho­ri­ty laun­ched an inves­ti­ga­ti­on. It suspec­ted Apple of abusing its domi­nant posi­ti­on and favou­ring its own ser­vices — a form of self-pre­fe­ren­cing also cri­ti­cis­ed by the BKar­tA. The com­plainants argued that the ATTF was desi­gned to inten­tio­nal­ly dis­ad­van­ta­ge third-par­ty adver­ti­sers.


Summary of the French decision

The rele­vant peri­od con­side­red by the aut­ho­ri­ty runs from April 2021 to July 2023. While this sug­gests that the inf­rin­ge­ment may have cea­sed, the BKartA’s state­ments indi­ca­te that it may still con­sider the con­duct to be ongo­ing. In any event, the French aut­ho­ri­ty also notes a con­tin­ued asym­me­try in how Apple tre­ats its own apps ver­sus third-par­ty apps.

The aut­ho­ri­ty ack­now­led­ged that user pri­va­cy is a legi­ti­ma­te con­cern. Howe­ver, it con­cluded that Apple’s imple­men­ta­ti­on of the ATTF impo­sed dis­pro­por­tio­na­te bur­dens on third-par­ty deve­lo­pers. The pro­cess for obtai­ning user con­sent was dee­med exces­si­ve­ly com­plex, and the requi­red pop-ups under­mi­ned the neu­tra­li­ty of the frame­work. Smal­ler app publishers, who rely more hea­vi­ly on user data, were par­ti­cu­lar­ly disadvantaged.

The aut­ho­ri­ty iden­ti­fied three key issues:

  1. Unneces­sa­ry com­ple­xi­ty and mis­a­lignment with data pro­tec­tion law (GDPR)
  2. Non-neu­tral con­sent pop-ups that dis­cri­mi­na­ted against third-par­ty apps
  3. Une­qual tre­at­ment of Apple’s own apps and third-par­ty apps

Legitimate purpose, disproportionate means

This case illus­tra­tes how com­pe­ti­ti­on law appli­es even in non-pri­ce-rela­ted plat­form con­duct. Apple acts as a gate­kee­per bet­ween users of its ope­ra­ting sys­tems and the app deve­lo­pers who seek access to tho­se users. The plat­form hosts both Apple’s own apps and tho­se from third par­ties. Com­pe­ti­ti­on law requi­res that the con­di­ti­ons impo­sed on third par­ties remain fair and non-discriminatory.


The French authority’s assessment framework

In its press release, the aut­ho­ri­ty empha­sis­ed that domi­nant under­ta­kings may adopt addi­tio­nal con­su­mer pro­tec­tion stan­dards, but they must com­ply with heigh­ten­ed respon­si­bi­li­ties due to their mar­ket power. This prin­ci­ple is well estab­lished in abu­se of domi­nan­ce cases. The grea­ter the mar­ket power, the grea­ter the respon­si­bi­li­ty to avo­id har­ming resi­du­al competition.

The aut­ho­ri­ty appli­ed a three-step pro­por­tio­na­li­ty test, simi­lar to frame­works known from con­sti­tu­tio­nal or admi­nis­tra­ti­ve law, but adapt­ed to the pri­va­te-sec­tor con­text of com­pe­ti­ti­on law:

  1. Legi­ti­ma­cy of pur­po­se: A domi­nant under­ta­king may pur­sue its own stra­te­gic goals, pro­vi­ded they are not anti­com­pe­ti­ti­ve. Howe­ver, with incre­asing mar­ket power, the jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on must meet a hig­her stan­dard of plausibility.
  2. Neces­si­ty of the means: The mea­su­re must be appro­pria­te and the­re must be no less rest­ric­ti­ve alter­na­ti­ve. Again, domi­nant firms face hig­her scrutiny.
  3. Pro­por­tio­na­li­ty in the nar­row sen­se: The bur­den impo­sed on com­pe­ti­tors must not out­weigh the legi­ti­ma­te aim pursued.

Alt­hough such tests are com­mon in public law, their adapt­a­ti­on to pri­va­te plat­form con­duct high­lights the con­ver­gence of regu­la­to­ry prin­ci­ples across dif­fe­rent legal domains. In Ger­man juris­pru­dence, for exam­p­le, con­sti­tu­tio­nal values are some­ti­mes used to inform com­pe­ti­ti­on law inter­pre­ta­ti­on. Whe­ther EU com­pe­ti­ti­on law is direct­ly bound by fun­da­men­tal rights remains an open legal question.


Why Apple’s implementation was deemed disproportionate

The French aut­ho­ri­ty con­cluded that Apple’s sta­ted aim — pri­va­cy pro­tec­tion — was legi­ti­ma­te. In this regard, it con­sul­ted the French data pro­tec­tion aut­ho­ri­ty (CNIL), which issued two opi­ni­ons. Such inter-agen­cy coope­ra­ti­on is incre­asing­ly com­mon in data-dri­ven com­pe­ti­ti­on cases.

Accor­ding to CNIL, the ATTF crea­ted unneces­sa­ry dupli­ca­ti­on of user con­sent requi­re­ments and intro­du­ced arti­fi­ci­al com­ple­xi­ty. The com­pe­ti­ti­on aut­ho­ri­ty adopted CNIL’s con­clu­si­ons and sum­ma­ri­sed its fin­dings as follows:

  • Unneces­sa­ry com­ple­xi­ty: Third-par­ty deve­lo­pers were sub­ject to addi­tio­nal con­sent mecha­nisms not requi­red under gene­ral data pro­tec­tion law.
  • Non-neu­tral user inter­face: Users had to give con­sent twice, but could reject track­ing in a sin­gle click. This asym­me­try dis­tor­ted user beha­viour to the dis­ad­van­ta­ge of third-par­ty apps and adver­ti­sing providers.
  • Dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry tre­at­ment: Apple’s own apps were initi­al­ly exempt from the con­sent requi­re­ment, while third-par­ty apps had to com­ply with the full con­sent pro­ce­du­re. This prac­ti­ce con­tin­ued until iOS 15. The CNIL had alre­a­dy fined Apple for this dis­crepan­cy, and the com­pe­ti­ti­on aut­ho­ri­ty also regards the asym­me­try as ongoing.

The aut­ho­ri­ty noted that smal­ler deve­lo­pers were par­ti­cu­lar­ly har­med, as they lack alter­na­ti­ve tar­ge­ting opti­ons and face addi­tio­nal hurd­les in acces­sing user data.


Fines and legal consequences

The €150 mil­li­on fine appears to be based on con­duct up to 25 July 2023. It remains unclear whe­ther the French aut­ho­ri­ty will take fur­ther action regar­ding the con­tin­ued dif­fe­ren­ti­al tre­at­ment of apps. It may be that only beha­viou­ral reme­dies are impo­sed for the ongo­ing con­duct, espe­ci­al­ly in light of the CNIL’s sepa­ra­te sanction.

Important­ly, dou­ble jeo­par­dy (ne bis in idem) does not app­ly here. Data pro­tec­tion and com­pe­ti­ti­on law vio­la­ti­ons con­sti­tu­te distinct legal offen­ces, and par­al­lel fines are legal­ly permissible.

Apple must also publish a sum­ma­ry of the decis­i­on on its web­site for seven days.


Broader implications

It is not yet known whe­ther Apple will appeal. Other inves­ti­ga­ti­ons — such as that by the BKar­tA — are ongo­ing. The Euro­pean Com­mis­si­on is also actively enfor­cing the Digi­tal Mar­kets Act (DMA). As a result, Apple curr­ent­ly faces regu­la­to­ry scru­ti­ny on mul­ti­ple fronts. The­se cases pro­be deep­ly into Apple’s pro­prie­ta­ry eco­sys­tem and rai­se the broa­der ques­ti­on of how far com­pe­ti­ti­on law can inter­ve­ne in com­mer­cial dis­cre­ti­on.

Bey­ond the fine its­elf, the pro­hi­bi­ti­on decis­i­on may have signi­fi­cant impli­ca­ti­ons. It could ser­ve as the legal basis for fol­low-on dama­ges claims by affec­ted parties.


We com­bi­ne aca­de­mic know­ledge with prac­ti­cal expe­ri­ence and stra­te­gic thin­king. Our firm under­stands both regu­la­to­ry law and mar­ket dyna­mics. We work at the inter­sec­tion of com­pe­ti­ti­on, data, plat­forms, and digi­tal dis­tri­bu­ti­on—brin­ging cla­ri­ty to com­plex legal environments.

About the author

Porträtbild von Dr. Sebastian Louven

Dr. Sebastian Louven

I have been an independent lawyer since 2016 and advise mainly on antitrust law and telecommunications law. Since 2022 I am a specialist lawyer for international business law.

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