Last updated: 7 October 2026
The Digital Markets Act (DMA) gives the European Commission a specific instrument to investigate structural questions that go beyond individual non-compliance proceedings. Market investigations under Articles 16 to 19 DMA serve three distinct purposes: the designation of gatekeepers, the investigation of systematic non-compliance, and the examination of new digital services or practices that are not yet adequately addressed by the DMA.
They must therefore be distinguished from individual enforcement proceedings under Article 20 DMA and from non-compliance decisions under Article 29 DMA.
How does the Commission open a DMA market investigation?
Article 16 DMA provides the common procedural framework. Where the Commission intends to conduct a market investigation with a view to a decision under Articles 17, 18 or 19 DMA, it adopts a decision opening the investigation. That decision must specify the opening date, the issue under investigation and the purpose of the investigation.
The Commission may nevertheless exercise its investigative powers before formally opening the market investigation. It may also reopen a completed investigation where there has been a material change in the underlying facts or where the previous decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information. National competent authorities may assist the Commission.
The DMA distinguishes three types of market investigation:
- designation of gatekeepers under Article 17 DMA;
- systematic non-compliance under Article 18 DMA; and
- new services and new practices under Article 19 DMA.
Market investigations for designating gatekeepers – Article 17 DMA
Article 17 DMA allows the Commission to investigate whether an undertaking providing core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper under Article 3(8) DMA. The Commission may also use the procedure to determine which core platform services should be included in a designation decision under Article 3(9) DMA.
This qualitative designation procedure is particularly important where an undertaking does not meet the quantitative thresholds in Article 3(2) DMA but may nevertheless satisfy the substantive gatekeeper criteria in Article 3(1).
The Commission shall endeavour to conclude such an investigation within twelve months. Preliminary findings should normally be communicated within six months.
Rebuttal proceedings
A second situation arises where an undertaking does meet the quantitative thresholds but submits sufficiently substantiated arguments under Article 3(5) DMA showing that, exceptionally, the relevant service does not satisfy the gatekeeper criteria.
If those arguments manifestly call the presumption into question, the Commission opens a market investigation under Article 17(3) DMA. In that case, the shorter timetable applies: the Commission should endeavour to conclude the investigation within five months and communicate preliminary findings within three months.
The Commission has already used this procedure in several cases, including investigations concerning Apple’s iMessage and Microsoft’s Bing, Edge and Microsoft Advertising. More recently, it concluded that Apple Maps and Apple Ads should not be designated following Apple’s rebuttal. The different designation proceedings and their outcomes are set out in our DMA Gatekeeper Designation Tracker.
Update 5 October 2026: The Commission is currently also conducting qualitative Article 17 investigations concerning Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft Azure. In June 2026, it communicated its preliminary view that both services should be designated as core platform services under the DMA.
Emerging gatekeepers
Article 17(4) DMA also addresses undertakings that do not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position but are expected to do so in the near future. Where such an undertaking is designated under Article 3(8), the Commission may make only certain obligations under Articles 5 and 6 applicable. Those obligations must be appropriate and necessary to prevent the undertaking from achieving an entrenched and durable position by unfair means.
Judicial review of designation investigations
The General Court has meanwhile clarified an important procedural issue. In its judgment of 8 July 2026 in the joined Apple cases, it held that the decisions opening and closing the Article 17(3) investigation concerning iMessage did not, in the circumstances of that case, produce binding legal effects capable of bringing about a distinct change in Apple’s legal position. Apple’s actions against those decisions were therefore inadmissible.
This is more precise than stating generally that decisions opening DMA market investigations cannot be challenged. Whether an act is reviewable depends on whether it produces binding legal effects.
Market investigations into systematic non-compliance – Article 18 DMA
Article 18 DMA addresses a different situation. It allows the Commission to investigate whether a gatekeeper has engaged in systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in Articles 5, 6 or 7 DMA.
Systematic non-compliance is presumed where the Commission has issued at least three non-compliance decisions under Article 29 against a gatekeeper within the eight years preceding the opening decision. This can concern different core platform services and different DMA obligations.
For the Commission to impose additional remedies under Article 18(1), the investigation must also show that the gatekeeper has maintained, strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the criteria in Article 3(1).
The Commission must conclude the investigation within twelve months and communicate preliminary findings within six months. The investigation may be extended on objectively justified and proportionate grounds, but extensions may not exceed six months in total.
Remedies
Article 18 gives the Commission substantially broader remedial powers than an ordinary non-compliance proceeding. It may impose behavioural or structural remedies that are proportionate and necessary to ensure effective compliance.
In particular, the remedy may include a temporary prohibition on entering into certain concentrations involving the affected core platform services, other digital-sector services or services enabling the collection of data. Interested third parties must be given an opportunity to comment on a non-confidential summary of the case and the remedies contemplated by the Commission.
The Commission may also make commitments offered by the gatekeeper binding under Article 25 DMA.
Market investigations into new services and new practices – Article 19 DMA
Article 19 DMA performs yet another function. It enables the Commission to examine whether:
- additional digital services should be added to the statutory list of core platform services in Article 2(2) DMA; or
- practices that limit contestability or are unfair are not effectively addressed by the existing DMA obligations.
The procedure therefore does not determine whether a particular gatekeeper has infringed an existing obligation. Instead, it provides an evidentiary basis for developing the regulatory framework itself. When conducting its assessment, the Commission must also take account of relevant findings from proceedings under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and other relevant developments.
The Commission must publish its findings within eighteen months. Depending on the outcome, the report may be accompanied by a legislative proposal to amend the list of core platform services or the obligations in Chapter III, or by a draft delegated act supplementing or updating obligations within the limits of Article 12 DMA.
Cloud computing services: the first major Article 19 investigation
The Commission opened an Article 19 market investigation into cloud computing services on 18 November 2025. It is examining, among other things, interoperability, switching barriers, access to data, tying and bundling, and contractual and commercial conditions.
This Article 19 investigation is distinct from the two Article 17 designation investigations concerning AWS and Microsoft Azure. The Commission intends to publish its Article 19 report by May 2027.
The distinction illustrates the different functions of the two instruments: Article 17 asks whether particular undertakings and services should fall within the existing DMA regime; Article 19 asks whether the regulatory regime itself adequately addresses developments in digital markets.
Market investigations and DMA enforcement
Market investigations form a separate part of the DMA’s regulatory architecture. They should not be equated with proceedings under Article 20 DMA concerning possible non-compliance with obligations already applicable to a gatekeeper.
This distinction matters particularly for competitors and business users. An individual enforcement proceeding may address a specific suspected infringement, whereas Articles 17 to 19 allow the Commission to examine more structural questions: whether an undertaking should be designated, whether repeated infringements justify additional remedies, or whether the DMA itself needs to evolve.
