DMA Gatekeeper Designation: AG Biondi on ByteDance and the Right to Be Heard

In his Opi­ni­on of 15 Octo­ber 2026 in Byte­Dance v Com­mis­si­on (C‑627/24 P), Advo­ca­te Gene­ral Andrea Bion­di addres­ses the requi­re­ments for rebut­ting the pre­sump­ti­ons under­ly­ing a DMA gate­kee­per desi­gna­ti­on. He also dis­agrees with the Gene­ral Cour­t’s assess­ment of Byte­Dan­ce’s right to be heard and pro­po­ses sub­sti­tu­ting the grounds of its judgment in this respect.

In Sep­tem­ber 2023, the Euro­pean Com­mis­si­on desi­gna­ted Byte­Dance as a gate­kee­per for its online social net­wor­king ser­vice Tik­Tok. Byte­Dance chal­len­ged the desi­gna­ti­on, arguing that it did not meet the qua­li­ta­ti­ve requi­re­ments of Artic­le 3(1) DMA despi­te excee­ding the quan­ti­ta­ti­ve thresholds.

The Gene­ral Court dis­missed the action in its judgment of 17 July 2024 (T‑1077/23). Byte­Dance sub­se­quent­ly appea­led to the Court of Justice.

Rebutting the presumptions under Article 3 DMA

Artic­le 3(2) DMA estab­lishes quan­ti­ta­ti­ve thres­holds giving rise to pre­sump­ti­ons that an under­ta­king meets the three qua­li­ta­ti­ve cri­te­ria for gate­kee­per desi­gna­ti­on under Artic­le 3(1) DMA.

Under Artic­le 3(5) DMA, under­ta­kings may sub­mit argu­ments demons­t­ra­ting that, excep­tio­nal­ly, they do not satis­fy tho­se qua­li­ta­ti­ve requi­re­ments despi­te mee­ting the quan­ti­ta­ti­ve thresholds.

The Advo­ca­te Gene­ral con­siders that rebut­ting the­se pre­sump­ti­ons requi­res a high degree of plau­si­bi­li­ty. Mere doubts about whe­ther the qua­li­ta­ti­ve requi­re­ments are met are insuf­fi­ci­ent. The under­ta­king must sub­mit suf­fi­ci­ent­ly con­vin­cing argu­ments capa­ble of cle­ar­ly cal­ling the pre­sump­ti­ons into question.

Howe­ver, it is not requi­red to estab­lish con­clu­si­ve­ly at this stage that the qua­li­ta­ti­ve cri­te­ria are not satis­fied. Other­wi­se, the distinc­tion bet­ween rebut­ting the pre­sump­ti­ons and con­duc­ting a mar­ket inves­ti­ga­ti­on would lose much of its significance.

The Advo­ca­te Gene­ral also addres­ses the Com­mis­si­on’s dis­cre­ti­on under Artic­le 3(5) DMA. Whe­re suf­fi­ci­ent­ly sub­stan­tia­ted argu­ments cle­ar­ly rebut the pre­sump­ti­ons, the Com­mis­si­on must, in prin­ci­ple, initia­te a mar­ket inves­ti­ga­ti­on rather than sim­ply reject tho­se arguments.

In the pre­sent case, howe­ver, the Advo­ca­te Gene­ral con­siders that Byte­Dan­ce’s argu­ments did not meet the requi­red standard.

In par­ti­cu­lar, the fact that users enga­ge in mul­ti­ho­ming, using Tik­Tok along­side com­pe­ting social net­wor­king ser­vices, does not neces­s­a­ri­ly mean that Tik­Tok can­not con­sti­tu­te an important gate­way for busi­ness users to reach end users within the mea­ning of Artic­le 3(1)(b) DMA.

Simi­lar­ly, the absence of an exten­si­ve digi­tal eco­sys­tem does not, in its­elf, pre­clude a fin­ding that a plat­form con­sti­tu­tes an important gateway.

The right to be heard: Substitution of the General Court’s grounds

A second important aspect of the Opi­ni­on con­cerns the pro­ce­du­ral rights of under­ta­kings during the desi­gna­ti­on procedure.

The Gene­ral Court had found that the Com­mis­si­on inf­rin­ged Byte­Dan­ce’s right to be heard in cer­tain respects. Nevert­hel­ess, it dis­missed the action becau­se tho­se pro­ce­du­ral irre­gu­la­ri­ties could not have affec­ted the out­co­me of the procedure.

The Advo­ca­te Gene­ral dis­agrees with the fin­ding of a pro­ce­du­ral infringement.

Alt­hough the right to be heard under Artic­le 41(2)(a) of the Char­ter of Fun­da­men­tal Rights appli­es, the Com­mis­si­on is not gene­ral­ly requi­red to give an under­ta­king a fur­ther oppor­tu­ni­ty to com­ment on its assess­ment of argu­ments and evi­dence sub­mit­ted by that under­ta­king itself.

The Advo­ca­te Gene­ral the­r­e­fo­re pro­po­ses sub­sti­tu­ting the grounds of the Gene­ral Cour­t’s judgment on this issue, while main­tai­ning the dis­mis­sal of Byte­Dan­ce’s action.

This distinc­tion has prac­ti­cal con­se­quen­ces for future desi­gna­ti­on procedures.

If the Court of Jus­ti­ce fol­lows the Advo­ca­te Gene­ral’s approach, under­ta­kings see­king to rebut the pre­sump­ti­ons under Artic­le 3 DMA will need to pre­sent their argu­ments and sup­port­ing evi­dence as com­pre­hen­si­ve­ly as pos­si­ble at an ear­ly stage of the admi­nis­tra­ti­ve procedure.

They can­not gene­ral­ly expect a fur­ther oppor­tu­ni­ty to respond to the Com­mis­si­on’s assess­ment of their sub­mis­si­ons befo­re the desi­gna­ti­on decis­i­on is adopted. This does not, howe­ver, exclude addi­tio­nal pro­ce­du­ral safe­guards whe­re the Com­mis­si­on reli­es on new evi­dence obtai­ned through its own inves­ti­ga­ti­ve measures.

The Opi­ni­on thus com­bi­nes a deman­ding stan­dard for rebut­ting the quan­ti­ta­ti­ve pre­sump­ti­ons with rela­tively limi­t­ed oppor­tu­ni­ties to sup­ple­ment sub­mis­si­ons in respon­se to the Com­mis­si­on’s assessment.

Implications for future DMA gatekeeper designations

The Opi­ni­on con­firms the importance of the quan­ti­ta­ti­ve thres­holds in the DMA’s desi­gna­ti­on mecha­nism. Alt­hough the pre­sump­ti­ons remain rebut­ta­ble, under­ta­kings face sub­stan­ti­al requi­re­ments when chal­len­ging their application.

At the same time, the Com­mis­si­on’s dis­cre­ti­on is not unli­mi­t­ed. Whe­re the argu­ments sub­mit­ted cle­ar­ly rebut the pre­sump­ti­ons, the Com­mis­si­on must gene­ral­ly pro­ceed to a mar­ket investigation.

The pro­po­sed sub­sti­tu­ti­on of grounds is par­ti­cu­lar­ly rele­vant to the con­duct of desi­gna­ti­on pro­cee­dings. It would cla­ri­fy that the Com­mis­si­on is not gene­ral­ly obli­ged to con­sult an under­ta­king again mere­ly becau­se it rea­ches an assess­ment of evi­dence that the under­ta­king its­elf submitted.

The Court of Jus­ti­ce has yet to deli­ver its judgment. The Advo­ca­te Gene­ral’s Opi­ni­on is not binding.

About the author

Picture of Author Dr. Sebastian Louven

Dr. Sebastian Louven

I am a German lawyer, a certified specialist in international business law and a partner at louven.legal. I advise and represent companies on competition law, telecommunications regulation and the regulation of digital markets. I also publish and teach regularly in these fields.

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